Abstract-Anonymous is one of the most important security properties for kinds of Internet applications. In this paper, we consider the privacy-preserving problem in the context of public key broadcast encryption. We provide a new security definition for anonymous public key broadcast encryption, and construct a new scheme. To achieve anonymous, we blind the ciphertexts using the random factors. Moreover, we use a pair of orthogonal bases to construct secret key and ciphertexts for proper decryption. Our anonymous publickey broadcast encryption scheme can be proven in the adaptive model without random oracle. The key technique used to obtain our result is an elaborate combination of the dual system encryption proposed by Waters and a new approach on bilinear pairings using the notion of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) proposed by Okamoto and Takasima.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many scenarios, it is crucial that the distributed content to a (large) set of users is kept private. In a commercial context, a broadcaster is interested in distributing digital content only to the paying customers. Similarly, an online store selling electronic books or digital music and movies wishes to keep the distributed content protected from any user but the proper customer. Companies are interested in distributing confidential information inside the company itself to a particular subset of employees (e.g.: accounting members, top management,...) avoiding people outside the group (or competitors) to learn about the information. To solve this problem, Fiat and Naor formulated the "Broadcast Encryption" problem and provided a first solution in [1] . In broadcast encryption, a sender can efficiently send a ciphertext to the set of receivers S that is arbitrary chosen by the sender, and a receiver can decrypt the ciphertext if he belongs to the set S. A trivial broadcast encryption system with linear size of ciphertexts can be built by using multiple instances of an encryption system. Therefore, a non-trivial broadcast encryption system should have sub-linear size of ciphertexts. Broadcast encryption is classified as public key or symmetric key depends on the type of keys, stateful or stateless depends on the need of private key update, and fully-collusion resistant or t-collusion resistant depends on the maximum number of collusion users.
A. Related Works
In recent years, a variety of BE systems have been proposed in [2] - [12] . Public-key broadcast encryption (PKBE) is a specific type of broadcast encryption such that anyone can create a ciphertext by using the the public key of broadcast encryption. Boneh et al. proposed the first stateless and fully-collusion resistant PKBE scheme by using the algebraic structure of bilinear groups in [10] . They first propose a simple PKBE scheme with linear size of public keys and constant size of ciphertexts, and then they proposed a generalized PKBE scheme with sublinear size of public keys and ciphertexts. After the pioneering work of Boneh et al., many other PKBE schemes with different properties were proposed in bilinear groups [13] - [15] . However, these PKBE schemes were proven to be secure in the static security model under q-type assumptions where the value q depends on the number of users in the system. The static security model is a weaker security model since the adversary should commit the target set S * before he receives the public key. The right security model of PKBE is the adaptive security model where the adversary adaptively requests private keys for arbitrary chosen indexes and later selects a target subset at the challenge step. Generally, a PKBE scheme in the static security model can be converted to a PKBE scheme in the adaptive security model if a simulator predicts the target set S * of the adversary by simply selecting an arbitrary set S . However, this method has a problem such that the probability of S * = S is less than 1/2 N where N is the number of users in the system. To achieve the adaptive security, Gentry and Waters proposed a new method that converts a semistatically secure PKBE scheme to an adaptively secure one by using the two-key technique in [16] . In the semistatic security model, an adversary first commits an initial set S , and it outputs the target set S * that is a subset of S in the challenge step. The adversary of the semi-static security model has more flexibility compared to the static security model. The two-key technique is a method to use two keys in private keys and the decryption algorithm success if one of the two keys is given.
B. Motivations and Contributions
While the traditional BE schemes have focused on protecting the broadcast contents from unauthorized users and reducing the length of the ciphertext or private key size, they have not concerned about protecting the identities of users allowed to access the contents. Who can access the contents, however, is often more sensitive than the contents themselves.
Suppose a university provides a document to students with low average grades. To maintain the privacy of the students, the set of authorized users should be kept private, not only from outsiders, but from the students in the group as well. In a commercial context an online seller would prefer to keep its list of customers secret and protect it from competing companies, e.g. to avoid competitors advertising. Digital media providers could be interested in protecting their customers privacy avoiding them to be profiled by the analysis of their purchases. A company, giving a call for tenders would like to keep recipients unrevealed to maintain the competition fair.
According to commonly accepted definitions given in [13] , [16] , [17] , a BE scheme consists of four algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt and Decrypt. Each user in the system can obtain his private key from the KeyGen algorithm, and the sender can choose an arbitrary target set of users S to which he wishes to broadcast a message. To decrypt, a legitimate user, i.e. a user in S, has to run the decryption algorithm on input the ciphertext, his private key and a description of the target set S. This set S is required specifically as an input to Decrypt in the existing definitions of BE. Hence the user needs to somehow know to which set S the message was broadcast, otherwise he cannot decrypt. Unfortunately, solving this problem is not just a matter of removing this requirement from the model, as current schemes explicitly rely on S as an input to Decrypt for decryption to work. Thus, a broadcaster exposes all of the public keys (or identities) of the receivers to the public by attaching them into the header of a broadcast message, such as the works of [10] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [13] , [21] , [16] , and so on. This violates the privacy of the receivers in many practical scenarios.
To solve this problem, Barth et al. proposed the first private broadcast encryption scheme in [22] , to protect the privacy of users of encrypted file systems and content delivery systems. Then, Hur et al. proposed a privacypreserving (anonymous) identity-based broadcast encryption scheme in [23] . However, their scheme only achieves selective secure in the random oracle model.
Our goals in this study are to provide recipient privacy: an encrypted broadcast message should hide who can access its contents, even from each other in the set of authorized receivers.
In this paper, we gave the formal definition of anonymous public-key broadcast encryption (ANON-PKBE) scheme, and described the new security definition. Then we proposed a specific ANON-PKBE scheme, and proved it in the standard model. In the construction of our scheme, we used the dual paring vector spaces (DPVS) proposed by Okamoto and Takashima in [24] to achieve anonymous. In the security proof, we used the dual system encryption proposed by Waters in [25] to obtain full security.
C. Organization
In Section 2, we recall some preliminaries. In Section 3, we give the formal definition of ANON-PKBE scheme and its new security definition. We describe the construction of our ANON-PKBE scheme in the Section 4. Then, we prove the security of the scheme in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. Dual Pairing Vector Space
Okamoto and Takashima [24] described the definition of dual pairing vector spaces.
Definition 1: "Symmetric bilinear pairing groups" (q, G, G T , g, e) are a tuple of a prime q, cyclic (multiplicative) group G and G T of order q, g = 1 ∈ G, and a polynomial-time computable non-degenerate bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T i.e., e(g s , g t ) = e(g, g) st and e(g, g) = 1. Let G bgp be an algorithm that takes input 1 λ and outputs a description of bilinear pairing group (q, G, G T , g, e) with security parameter λ.
In this paper, we concentrate on this symmetric version of dual pairing vector spaces constructed by using symmetric bilinear pairing groups given in Definition 1. Definition 2: "Dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS)" (q, V, G T , A, e) by a direct product of symmetric pairing groups (q, G, G T , g, e) are a tuple of prime q, Ndimensional vector space V := n G × · · · × G over F q , cyclic group G T of order q, canonical basis A := (a 1 , ..., a n ) of V, where a i := (
.., g n ) ∈ V and y := (h 1 , ..., h n ) ∈ V. This is non-degenerate bilinear i.e., e(sx, ty) = e(x, y) st and if e(x, y) = 1 for ally ∈ V, then x = 0. For all i and j, e(a i , a j ) = g δi,j
T , where δ i,j = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise, and g T := e(g, g) = 1 ∈ G T . DPVS generation algorithm G dpvs takes input 1 λ (λ ∈ N) and n ∈ N, and output a description of param V := (q, V, G T , A, e) with security parameter λ and N-dimensional V. It can be constructed by using G bpg .
We describe random dual orthonormal bases generator below, which is used as a subroutine in the proposed PPBE scheme.
B. Assumption
Definition 3: "n-eDDH: n-Extended Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption" The n-eDDH problem is to guess β ∈ {0, 1},
For a probabilistic machine C, we define the advantage of C for the n-eDDH problem as:
The n-eDDH assumption is: For any polynomial-time adversary C, the advantage Adv
III. NEW DEFINITION OF ANONYMOUS PUBLIC-KEY BROADCAST ENCRYPTION
Similar to the traditional public-key broadcast encryption scheme, a anonymous public-key broadcast encryption scheme consists of probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt. They are given as follows:
The Setup algorithm takes as input security parameter λ and the total number of users in this system n (the users are indexed to 1, ..., n) outputs public key P K, and secret key SK.
KeyGen(i, SK): Takes as input an index i ∈ {1, ..., n} and the secret key SK. It outputs a private key sk i .
Encrypt(P K, S, M ): The Encrypt algorithm takes as input the public key PK, subset S of all users (S ⊆ {1, ..., n}), and plaintext M . It returns ciphertext C.
Decrypt(P K, sk i , C): The Decrypt algorithm takes as input the public key P K, secret key sk i , and ciphertext C. It outputs either plaintext M or the distinguished symbol ⊥.
Note that, in the description of Decrypt algorithm, the receiver set S, is no longer as input. This point is the main difference between ANON-PKBE scheme and traditional PKBE scheme.
An ANON-PKBE scheme should have the following correctness property: for all receivers sets S and plaintext M , for correctly generated P K, SK, sk i ← KeyGen(i, SK), and C ← Encrypt(P K, S, M ), it holds that M = Decrypt(P K, sk i , C), if i ∈ S. Otherwise, it holds with negligible probability.
Definition 4: An anonymous public-key broadcast encryption scheme is adaptively anonymous and indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks (ANON-IND-CPA) if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, the advantage of A in the following experiment is negligible in the security parameter:
Setup. Setup algorithm is run to generate keys P K and SK, and P K is given to A.
Phase 1 (KeyGen). A may adaptively corrupt user i ∈ {1, ...n} in this system. In response, A is given the corresponding key sk i .
Challenge. A outputs two challenge plaintexts M 0 , M 1 (|M 0| = |M 1|), and two challenge receivers sets S 0 , S 1 ⊆ {1, ...n}, subject to the restriction that i / ∈ {S 0 S 1 } − {S 0 S 1 } for all corrupted user i in Phase 1. If there are some Corrupt queries to
In response, A is given the corresponding key sk i .
Guess. A outputs a bit β * , and succeeds if β * = β. We define the advantage of A as the quantity Adv
IV. ANONYMOUS PUBLIC-KEY BROADCAST ENCRYPTION SCHEME In this section, we proposed a new construction of ANON-PKBE, which is inspired by a new functional encryption system proposed in EUROCRYPT 2010 by Lewko et al. [26] . Our new ANON-PKBE scheme uses the notion of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) proposed by Okamoto and Takashima [24] .
KeyGen(i, SK): For all users i ∈ {1, ...n}, σ i , η i U ← − F q , and sets
B. Correctness
V. SECURITY PROOF Theorem 1: The proposed ANON-PKBE scheme is adaptively anonymous and indistinguishable against chosen plaintext attacks (ANON-IND-CPA) under n-eDDH assumption. For any adversaryA, there exist probabilistic machines C k (k = 0, ..., n), whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameterλ,
where n is the number of users in this system.
The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 18 in the work of [26] . Firstly, we give two related definitions.
Definition 5: "Problem 1" is to guess β ∈ {0, 1}, given , 2n) , where
. For a probabilistic machine B, we define the advantage of B for Problem 1 as: , 2n) , where Proof Outline of Theorem 1: To prove the security, we employ Game 0 (original game) through Game 3. Roughly speaking, the (normal) target ciphertext is changed to a semi-functional ciphertext in Game 1 (or Game 2-0), the secret key of k-th index replied to the adversary is changed to a semi-functional key in Game 2-k (k = 1, ..., n), and the (semi-functional) target ciphertext is changed to perfectly randomized key in Game 3, whose advantage is 0. A normal secret key sk norm i is correct form of the secret key of the proposed PPBE scheme, i.e.
Similarly, a normal ciphertext is(C norm 1 , C 2 ), where
In the following description, we will omit C 2 , because it is always in the normal form.
Semi-functional key: 1,1 , δ 1 x 1,2 , ...., δ 1 x s,1 , δ 1 x s,2 , y s+1,1 , y s+1,2 , ..., y n,1 , y n,2 , s, ζ, 0, δ 2 ) B , where r, s , which is uniformly and independently distributed over F q since r, s U ← − F 2n q (i.e., leads to random decryption).
To prove that the advantage gap between Game0 and 1 is bounded by the advantage of Problem 1 (to guess β ∈ {0, 1}), we construct a simulator of the challenge of Game 0 (or 1) (against an adversary A) by using an instance with β U ← − {0, 1} of Problem 1. We then show that the distribution of the secret keys and target ciphertext replied by the simulator is equivalent to those of Game 0 when β = 0 and Game 1 when β = 1. That is, the advantage of Problem 1 is equivalent to the advantage gap between Games 0 and 1 (Lemma 1). The advantage of Problem 1 is proven to be equivalent to that of the n-eDDH assumption [26] .
The advantage gap between Game 2-(k-1) and 2-k is similarly shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 2 (i.e., of the n-eDDH assumption)+1/q (Lemma 2).
Here, we introduce special form of semi-functional keys and ciphertexts such that 1,1 , δ 1 x 1,2 , ...., δ 1 x s,1 , δ 1 x s,2 , y s+1,1 , y s+1,2 , ..., y n,1 , y n,2 , (ρx 1,1 , ρx 1,2 , ...., ρx s,1 , ρx s,2 , y s+1,1 , y s+1,2 , ..., y n,1 , y n,2 )U, ζ, 0,
where Z is a random regular (n × n)−matrix, U := (Z −1 ) T , and τ, ρ 1 , ρx 1,2 , ...., ρx s,1 , ρx s,2 , y s+1,1 , y s+1,2 , ...,
0, ..., 0)Z and (ρx 1,1 , ρx 1,2 , ...., ρx s,1 , ρx s,2 , y s+1,1 , y s+1,2 , ..., y n,1 , y n,2 )U are uniformly and pairwise-independently distributed. Therefore, when i / ∈ S, the joint distribution of sk * spec.semi i and C spec.semi 1 is equivalent to that of an independent pair of sk * semi i and C semi 1 (except with probability 1/q). Finally we show that Game 2-n can be conceptually changed to Game 3 by using the fact that 2n elements of B, (b 2n+1 , b 2 , ..., b 4n ) ,are secret to the adversary (Lemma 3).
Proof of Theorem 1:
To prove Theorem 1, we consider the following (n+3) games. Game 0 Original game. Game 1 Same as Game 0 except that the target ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ) for challenge plaintexts (M 0 , M 1 ) and challenge user sets (S 0 , S 1 ) is
where, for ∀j ∈ U − S β , δ 1 , δ 2 , ζ, y j,1 , y j,2
Game 2-k (k=1,...,n) Game 2-0 is Game 1. Game 2-k is same as Game 2-(k-1) except the corrupt query reply to the index of k is
Game 3 Same as Game 2-n except that the target ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ) for challenge plaintexts (m 0 , m 1 ) and challenge user sets (S 0 , S 1 )is
In particular, we note that ζ and (x 1 , ..., x 2n ) are chosen uniformly and independently from ζ and {x i , y i }of Game 0 Game2-n. Let Adv We will use three lemmas (Lemmas 1-3) that evaluate the gaps between pairs of Adv (0) 
From the work of [26] (Lemma 20 and 22) , there exist probabilistic machines C k (k = 1, ...., n), whose running times are essentially the same as those of B k , respectively, such that Adv
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Below, we will give four lemmas for the proof of Theorem 1:
Lemma 1: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 0 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv
Proof . The proof of this lemma is similar to the work of [26] (Lemma 24). In order to prove Lemma 1, we construct a probabilistic machine B 0 against Problem 1 by using any adversary A in a security game (Game 0 or 1) as a black box as follows:
1) B 0 is given Problem 1 instance (param V ,B,B * , {e γ,i } i=1,...,2n ). 2) B 0 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. 3) At the first step of the game, B 0 returns P K := (1 λ , param V ,B, h 1 , h 2 ) to A. 4) When a corrupt query is issued, B 0 answers a correct secret key computed by usingB * , i.e., normal key. Otherwise, B 0 outputs γ := 0. Claim 1: If γ = 0, the distribution of (C 1 , C 2 ) generated in step 5 is the same as that in Game 0. If γ = 1, the distribution of (C 1 , C 2 ) generated in step 5 is the same as that in Game 1. 
From Claim 1, when γ = 0, the advantage of A in the above game is equal to that in Game 0, i.e., Adv (0) A (λ), and is also equal to
Similarly, when γ = 1, we see that the advantage of A in the above game is equal to Adv (1) A (λ), and is also equal to
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B k , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv
Proof . The proof of this lemma is similar to the work of [26] (Lemma 25). In order to prove Lemma 2, we construct a probabilistic machine B k against Problem 2 by using any adversary A in a security game (Game 2-(k-1) or 2-k) as a black box as follows:
1) B k is given Problem 2 instance (param V ,B,B * , {h * β,i , e i } i=1,...,2n ). 2) B k plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. 3) At the first step of the game, B k returns P K := (1 λ , param V ,B, h 1 , h 2 ) to A. 4) When the s-th corrupt query is issued for i ∈ {1, ..., n}, B k answers as follows: a) When 1 ≤ s ≤ k − 1, B k calculates and answers (by usingB * )
where σ i , η i , r 1 , ..., r 2n U ← − F q (i.e., semifunctional key). b) When s = k, B k calculates and answers sk * i as follows:
c) When s ≥ k + 1, B k answers a correct secret key computed by usingB * , i.e., normal key. Otherwise, B k outputs β := 0. Claim 2: The secret key sk * i generated in case (b) of step 4 or 6 and ciphertext C 1 generated in step 5 has the same distribution as that in Game 2-(k-1) (resp. Game 2-k) when β = 0 (resp. β = 1) except with probability 1/q. Proof . We consider the joint distribution of C 1 and sk * . Ciphertext C 1 generated in step 5 is C 1 := i∈S b e β,i + ζb 4n+1 + δ 2 b 4n+3 , where e β,i are from the Problem 2 instance, ζ, δ 2 U ← − F q . When β = 0, secret key sk * generated in step 4 or 6 is
When β = 0, secret key sk * generated in step 4 or 6 is
. Therefore, generated C 1 and sk * has the same joint distribution as in Game 2 − k (i.e., semi-functional ciphertext and semi-functional key), except with probability 1/q. From Claim 2, when β = 0, the advantage of A in the above game is equal to that in Game 2 − (k − 1), i.e., Adv
, and is also equal to
. When β = 1, except in the event that occurs with probability 1/q, the above game is the same as Game 2 − k. Hence, when β = 1, since the advantage of A in the above game is equal to In the light of the adversary's view, both (B, B * ) and (D, D * ) are consistent with public key P K := (1 λ , param V ,B, h 1 , h 2 ). Therefore, {sk i } i=1,...,n and C 1 above can be expressed as keys and ciphertext in two ways, in Game 2 − n over bases (B, B * ) and in Game 3 over bases (D, D * ). Thus, Game 2−n can be conceptually changed to Game 3.
Lemma 4: For any adversary A, Adv
A (λ)=0. Proof . The value of b is independent from the adversary's view in Game 3. Hence, Adv (3) A (λ)=0.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose the formal definition of anonymous public-key broadcast encryption (ANON-PKBE) scheme, and described the new security definition. Then we proposed a specific ANON-PKBE scheme, and proved it in the standard model.
Although our scheme meets all of security requirements, its efficiency is relatively low. It is still an open problem, to construct a practical ANON-PKBE scheme, which is ANON-IND-CPA in the standard model. 
